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An Approach to Improving Judicial Review of
the APA’s “Good Cause” Exception to Noticeand-Comment Rulemaking
KEVIN HARTNETT, JR.†
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Families First Coronavirus
Response Act to ensure that workers suffering from COVID19 could use their paid sick leave.1 It charged the Secretary
of Labor with administering the law by issuing necessary
rules.2 Since the ordinary process for promulgating
regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act

†J.D. Candidate, 2021, University at Buffalo School of Law; Editor-In-Chief,
Buffalo Law Review. I want to thank my Buffalo Law Review colleagues, Nichole
Austin, Jenna Bauer, Cecilia Meyer, Katherine Fleming, Erin Kopasz, Ashley
Love, Chelsea Reinhardt, Karthik Sekharan, and Kimberly VanOpdorp for
scrupulously checking my sources and correcting my errors. I also want to express
my gratitude to Professor Matthew Steilen, for teaching an inspiring course in
Administrative Law and for his insightful review of earlier drafts of this piece.
I’d also like to thank Joseph Gerken, for his review of earlier drafts and for his
course in Federal Legal Research, where much of the research for this piece was
conducted. Finally, none of this would be possible without the unwavering
support of my family, broadly construed.
1. Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020).
2. See Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85
Fed. Reg. 19,326 (Apr. 6, 2020).
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(“APA”),3 the notice-and-comment procedure,4 can take
months or even years to complete,5 Congress stipulated that

3. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the history and purpose of the APA, see
George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (1996).
4. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2018). Noticeand-comment is an informal rulemaking process that agencies must follow when
issuing a rule, which consists of three steps. First, an agency looking to
promulgate a binding rule must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking
(“NPRM”) in the Federal Register at least thirty days before the rule’s effective
date. § 553(b), (d). At this stage, the agency is merely proposing a rule which is
not yet in effect. The notice must provide the time, place, and nature of public
rulemaking proceedings; it must reference the legal authority under which the
rule is proposed; and it must include either the terms or substance of the proposed
rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. § 553(b)(1)–(3). Second,
after issuing the NPRM, the agency must give “interested persons” an
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking by submitting “written data, views,
or arguments.” § 553(c). In other words, the agency must allow those who might
be particularly affected by the rule to comment on it and voice their concerns.
Finally, after consideration of the public comments, the agency issues a final rule
and accompanies it with a “concise general statement” of the rule’s basis and
purpose. Id.
This process also applies when an agency looks to amend or repeal a rule.
§ 551(5). If an agency’s organic statute requires rulemaking to be “on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing,” then the APA’s formal rulemaking
procedures located in sections 556 and 557 are required. § 553(c); see also United
States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 235 (1973) (holding that under 1966
amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, language of provision authorizing
Commission to act “after hearing” was not equivalent of a requirement that a rule
be made “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing” so as to trigger
stricter rulemaking proceedings under the APA). Other types of rulemaking
include hybrid, direct-final, and negotiated. See TODD GARVEY & DANIEL T.
SHEDD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (2017). By far the most common form of rulemaking—and the
focus of this Comment—is informal. See MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32240, THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW 5 (2013) (“Informal
rulemaking, also known as ‘notice and comment’ rulemaking, is used much more
frequently.”).
5. Despite the widely recognized public benefits associated with notice-andcomment, see, e.g., Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666,
680 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that public participation in informal rulemaking
is meant to generate “the wisest rules” possible); Michael Asimow, Interim-Final
Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 707–08 (1999) (“Public input
provides valuable information to rulemaking agencies at low cost to the agencies.
Rules adopted with public participation are likely to be more effective and less
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the circumstances fit within the APA’s “good cause”
exception.6 Accordingly, the regulations implementing the
law took effect the day they were published.
The good cause exception allows an agency to bypass
notice-and-comment,7 and the thirty-day publication
requirement “when the agency for good cause finds (and
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
costly to administer than rules written without such participation. They contain
fewer mistakes. They are more likely to deal with unexpected and unique
applications or exceptional situations.”); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in
Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 369 (1972) (expressing the
“axiomatic” need for public participation in a process that is so similar to the
legislative process); Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act’s “Good
Cause” Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 113, 116–17 (1984) (arguing that public
participation in rulemaking makes the apparent lack of political accountability
of agency administrators more palatable); Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative
Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 255 (1986)
(explaining that the informal rulemaking process promotes efficiency, fairness,
and an overall “more rationally coherent rule”), it is also well known that noticeand-comment can be quite burdensome, costly, and time-consuming. See Jordan,
supra, at 118 (suggesting that in some situations the value of public participation
may be outweighed by the need for efficiency); Thomas O. McGarity, Some
Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1397
(1992) (asserting that subjects of progressive social regulation and their trade
associations have “fiercely resisted the rulemaking process, seeking to lard it up
with procedural, structural, and analytical trappings that have the predictable
effect of slowing down the agency”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify
Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 60 (1995) (noting various studies that
bolster the complaints of administrative law scholars that agency rulemaking has
become ossified). As a result, agencies often try to take advantage of exceptions
to notice-and-comment when they are available.
6. Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178, 190 (2020). Congressional intent to
waive notice-and-comment is one of the few scenarios this Comment contends is
worthy of the exception. See infra Part I.
7. An agency’s decision to invoke the APA’s good cause exception also
relieves it of obligations outside of the APA. For example, when an agency
promulgates a rule under the good cause exception it does not have to comply
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which requires the agency to prepare impact
statements of the rule on small business. Asimow, supra note 5, at 709. In
addition, the agency does not have to perform the requirements of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act, which requires the agency to provide cost-benefit analyses
for certain significant regulatory actions. Id. at 709–10.
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public interest.”8 The exception’s aim is to “strike a
pragmatic compromise between the costs and delays
inherent in complying” with informal rulemaking and “the
public benefits that accrue from complying with those
provisions.”9 To effectuate this balance, the legislative
history of the APA provides that the exception should be
narrowly construed and should not be used as an “escape
clause.”10
The good cause exception has become central to the
notice-and-comment process,11 but federal courts have

8. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), (d) (2018). The APA
enumerates three categories of exceptions to its informal rulemaking procedures,
one of which is the good cause exception. A second cluster of rules are “wholly
exempt” from the requirements of section 553. JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R44356, THE GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION TO NOTICE AND COMMENT
RULEMAKING: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION 1 (2016). This group is
comprised of rules pertaining to (1) a military or foreign affairs function of the
United States, (2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel, or (3) a
matter relating to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
§ 553(a)(1)–(2). The final group contains “nonlegislative” rules, which are exempt
from section 553(b) and (c)’s notice-and-comment requirements. “Nonlegislative”
rules, as opposed to legislative or substantive rules, do not purport to carry the
“force of law” and thus do not bind the public’s behavior. COLE, supra, at 2. These
rules come in three flavors. First are rules concerning “agency organization,
procedure, or practice.” § 553(b)(3)(A). The second type are “interpretative” rules.
Id. Generally speaking, an interpretative rule merely clarifies existing
obligations, it does not create new ones. Finally, section 553(b)(3)(A) also exempts
“general statements of policy” from notice-and-comment procedures.
9. Asimow, supra note 5, at 707.
10. S. REP. No. 79–752, at 200 (1945) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
11. In 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that about
35% of major rules and about 44% of nonmajor rules were issued without an
NPRM between 2003 and 2010. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1321, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND
TO PUBLIC COMMENTS 8 (2012). Of the agency rules examined in the GAO’s
sample, agencies invoked the good cause exception in 77% of major rules and 61%
of nonmajor rules promulgated without an NPRM. Id. at 15. Major rules are those
that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs determines to, among other
things, have or be likely to have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million
or more. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2); see also Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian
Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1125 (2009) (“It is hard to
overemphasize the importance of the ‘good cause’ exception. Notice-and-comment
rulemaking is central to modern administrative law and practice, and at the
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struggled in cases where they review its use, leading to
uncertainty and inconsistent outcomes.12 This uncertainty is
especially problematic given the exception’s potential to
undermine basic principles of representative democracy
when abused.13 Many are already uneasy about the dangers
of a growing administrative state.14 So to help settle at least
one of those fears, it is critical that courts ensure the good
cause exception is used only when absolutely necessary.

center of the statutory procedures for notice-and-comment rulemaking is an
open-ended override for emergency situations.”).
12. See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN
L. REV. 65, 87–90 (2015).
13. See James Yates, Comment, “Good Cause” is Cause for Concern, 86 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1438, 1463 (2018) (“The increased use of the good cause exception
has far-reaching effects. The exception undermines our democratic system
because it permits agencies to issue rules without public participation. Previous
presidents have used this mechanism to promulgate rules, none with more
success than Obama. Now Trump is using it to try to unravel the rules Obama
implemented before leaving office. This game of administrative ping pong
threatens the legitimacy of our administrative state. It allows agencies to
regulate without public participation and encourages abuse during
administration changes.”); Nathanael Paynter, Comment, Flexibility and Public
Participation: Refining the Administrative Procedure Act’s Good Cause Exception,
2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 397, 399 (2011) (“[I]n order to limit the power given to
agencies acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, and to protect basic principles of
representative democracy in rulemaking, changes to the good cause exception are
necessary.”).
14. See, e.g., City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313 (2013) (Roberts,
J., dissenting) (“The Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s ‘vast and
varied federal bureaucracy’ and the authority administrative agencies now hold
over our economic, social, and political activities. Ibid. ‘[T]he administrative state
with its reams of regulations would leave them rubbing their eyes.’” (quoting
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting))). The
constitutional infirmity of the administrative state, however, is only ostensible.
Analyzed with care, constitutional text, structure, and history can be synthesized
to provide support for the administrative state. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 64–65
(1994) (interpreting James Madison’s suggestion to the Committee of the Whole
that executive power includes powers “not Legislative nor Judiciary” as referring
to “administrative” power); Garrett West, Note, Congressional Power Over Office
Creation, 128 YALE L.J. 166, 177 (2018) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper
Clause and the Appointments Clause, read together, grant Congress the
authority to create executive-branch offices).
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One of the reasons for the confusion is substantive.
Courts struggle in their attempt to identify the types of
circumstances that warrant use of the exception. This is
mainly due to the vagueness in the statutory language.15 So
to balance the need for public participation in agency
rulemaking with the desire for administrative efficiency in
that process, courts should ensure that only compelling,
clearly circumscribed situations qualify for the exception.
This Comment argues, as others have, that those
circumstances are (1) where prior notice would subvert the
underlying statutory scheme; (2) where Congress intends to
waive notice-and-comment; and (3) emergencies.16
Another cause for confusion involves a circuit split over
the proper standard for reviewing an agency’s use of the
exception.17 Some review the action de novo,18 others for
arbitrary and capriciousness.19 This Comment argues that
neither is sufficient, since either approach treats an agency’s
good cause determination as a one-dimensional action rather
than the multifaceted decision that it is. In other words,
applying arbitrary and capricious review, on its own, to an
agency’s decision to use good cause affords deference to
agencies in areas where it is not due—namely to legal
conclusions—and applying only de novo review withholds
deference in areas where the agency should receive it—
namely to factual determinations.20 Accordingly, this
15. See James Kim, Note, For a Good Cause: Reforming the Good Cause
Exception to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1070–71 (2011).
16. See generally id.
17. This Comment focuses on “administrative law in the trenches—in the
federal courts of appeal,” which is “the terrain in which administrative law
actually operates.” Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1097.
18. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
20. Cf. Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review,
92 N.C.L.R. 721, 724 (2014) (rejecting a “one-dimensional” approach that treats
arbitrary and capricious review as a unitary concept—“as applying the same
standard in the same way across all manner of agency conduct”—and instead
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Comment argues for a two-step analysis, where the standard
of review at step one is “arbitrary and capricious,” and the
standard at step two is de novo. At least one court and one
commentator advocate advocate for such a review, calling it
the “mixed” standard.21 These approaches to improving
judicial review of the good cause exception are consistent
with the spirit and the text of the APA;22 they better embrace
the “complexity and multidimensional nature” of agency
rulemaking;23 and they further the purpose of the narrowlyprescribed good cause exception. Just as importantly, they
will ensure consistency in courts’ examination of the
exception as contemplated by the APA.
The remaining Parts of this Comment proceed as follows:
Part I aims to help courts identify, in the first instance,
precisely what circumstances are so compelling as to merit
the use of the exception, arguing that the vagueness of the
statutory language contributes to this difficult task.24 To do
arguing that arbitrary and capricious review should divide administrative
decisions into their constituent parts).
21. See United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 509 (3d Cir. 2013); Kelli M.
Golinghorst, Note, Meet Me in the Middle: The Search for the Appropriate
Standard of Review for the APA’s Good Cause Exception, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1277,
1300 (2018). This Comment employs the terms “mixed,” “bifurcated,” and “twostep analysis” interchangeably to mean the same thing—a standard of review
that applies one standard to factual determinations and another to legal
conclusions.
22. See Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 509 (arguing that the “mixed” standard “is
consistent with the text of § 706” because that section “includes no requirement
that only one provision of the section be applied to a particular review” which
enables courts “to apply one standard to legal determinations and another to
factual determinations made in an administrative decision”).
23. Virelli, supra note 20, at 727.
24. See Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1123 (“But what exactly are the ‘terms’
that the agency must obey? The APA’s text is largely vacuous on this point; ‘good
cause’ is an open-ended standard that essentially delegates the issue to future
decisions of agencies and judges.”). Another problem is, of course, politics. At least
for politically contentious or economically significant rules, judges of different
affiliations might choose to uphold a particular rule despite a dubious good cause
claim or strike it down notwithstanding a strong one. Cf. Yates, supra note 13, at
1449–50 (2018). Analyzing this political element is, however, beyond the scope of
this Comment.
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so, Part I collects a number of federal decisions that have
dealt with an agency’s use of good cause in compelling
circumstances and files them according to their respective
fact patterns. This Part argues that only these compelling
fact patterns warrant dispensing with notice-and-comment.
Part II discusses the circuit split over the standard of review
of the good cause exception, describing the “mixed” standard
as it was discussed by the Third Circuit in Reynolds in its
analysis of a prior decision, Philadelphia Citizens in Action
v. Schweiker.25 Then, Part II argues that the “mixed”
standard is correct and offers some justifications for it. In
doing so, Part II addresses a fundamental disagreement
driving the circuit split that this Comment contends has not
been sufficiently explored: whether to classify good cause as
a “legal conclusion” or a “discretionary decision.”26 To answer
this question, Part II argues first that good cause actually
consists of two distinct parts or steps: (1) the agency’s factual
findings supporting its decision to invoke good cause; and (2)
the ultimate conclusion that these findings are so compelling
as to rise to the level of rendering prior notice-and-comment
“impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.”27 The issue is how to classify the second step. Part
II ultimately concludes that such action is a legal conclusion
subject to de novo review. Finally, Part III argues that the
mixed standard is not an outlier despite the Reynolds court
referring to it as one.28 Specifically, as a practical matter,
other circuits have applied some form of mixed review,
whether or not they declared that they were applying such
review.

25. 669 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1982).
26. See COLE, supra note 8, at 13.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2018); cf. Babette E. L. Boliek, Agencies in Crisis? An
Examination of State and Federal Agency Emergency Powers, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3339, 3363 (2013).
28. Cf. COLE, supra note 8, at 14 n.129 (“It is unclear whether other courts
that apply de novo review to agency good cause determinations would recognize
[the mixed standard] as distinct.”).
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WHAT CONSTITUTES “GOOD CAUSE”?

Before discussing the standard of review, this Part aims
to help courts identify precisely what circumstances are
sufficiently compelling so as to merit the use of the good
cause exception. This substantive difficulty compounds the
problems associated with the circuit split over the standard
of review29 and can be attributed to the vagueness of the
statutory language itself.30 The exception’s language is
skeletal; it only limits good cause to broad, open-ended
situations where prior notice-and-comment would be
“impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.”31 According to the Senate Judiciary Committee:
“Impracticable” means a situation in which the due and required
execution of the agency functions would be unavoidably prevented
by its undertaking public rule-making proceedings. “Unnecessary”
means unnecessary so far as the public is concerned, as would be
the case if a minor or merely technical amendment in which the
public is not particularly interested were involved. “Public interest”
supplements the terms “impracticable” or “unnecessary”; it requires
that public rule-making procedures shall not prevent an agency
from operating and that, on the other hand, lack of public interest
in rule making warrants an agency to dispense with public
procedure.32

The Attorney General’s APA manual also endorsed these
interpretations.33 But although the language purports to
suggest separate categories, agencies and courts have not
treated them as distinct.34 In particular, “impracticable” and

29. See COLE, supra note 8, at 4; Raso, supra note 12, at 113 (“[E]ven the most
diligent courts may struggle to treat each of the many different combinations of
case facts consistently.”).
30. Kim, supra note 15, at 1071; see also Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1123
(“The APA’s text is largely vacuous[;] . . . ‘good cause is an open-ended standard
that essentially delegates the issue to future decisions of agencies and judges.”).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).
32. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 200.
33. Yates, supra note 13, at 1443 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30–31 (1947)).
34. See Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment
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“contrary to the public interest” often cover the same
situations.35 This overlap permits too much discretion and
leads to judicial disagreements over precisely what
circumstances rise to the level of good cause, all other things
being equal.
One way to cabin agency discretion is to create a more
pronounced, fact-based separation between these categories.
To do so, it is helpful to explore the various types of fact
scenarios that courts have deemed sufficient to justify
dispensing with notice-and-comment. Accordingly, this Part
files these cases into three distinct contexts: (1) where prior
notice would subvert the underlying statutory scheme; (2)
where Congress intends to waive notice-and-comment; and
(3) emergencies.36 Each is reviewed below.
A. Where Prior Notice Would Undermine the Statutory
Scheme
One frequent context where courts have upheld an
agency’s decision to invoke good cause is where the claim was
that prior notice would frustrate the underlying statutory
scheme.37 Deciding whether the exception is warranted in
these cases requires courts to examine the “nature” of the
interests that could be harmed by prior notice and weigh
them against the preference for public participation.38 Such
a situation frequently arises in areas of economic
regulation.39 A famous example occurred in Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Department of Energy.40 In that case, the Federal Energy
Rulemaking Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J.
317, 351 (1989) (noting the “formalistic” approach to the good cause exemption is
not followed in administrative practice or by courts (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Kim, supra note 15, at 1050.
35. See Jordan, supra note 5, at 118–19; Kim, supra note 15, at 1050.
36. COLE, supra note 8, at 4–5; see also Kim, supra note 15, at 1053.
37. COLE, supra note 8, at 8; Kim, supra note 15, at 1055.
38. See Lavilla, supra note 34, at 381; Kim, supra note 15, at 1055.
39. Lavilla, supra note 34, at 381; Kim, supra note 15, at 1055.
40. 728 F.2d 1477 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983).
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Administration (“FEA”) invoked the good cause exception
when it issued an interim-final rule (“IFR”) that regulated oil
price controls.41 The new rule sought to clarify a loophole in
existing regulations that oil sellers were taking advantage of
to avoid FEA regulations.42 In support of its decision to
uphold the FEA’s decision to invoke good cause, the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals reasoned that if the
FEA were to disclose the rule for notice-and-comment, oil
sellers would then become aware of the ambiguity in the law
and distort the market—a problem that the price control
regulation sought to remedy.43
A similar case is DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc.44 There,
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 imposed a freeze on
season ticket pricing to professional football games.45
President Nixon issued an executive order pursuant to the
Act, and the ensuing regulations implementing the price
controls were promulgated without notice-and-comment

41. Id. at 1482. In addition to bypassing notice-and-comment, the agency also
does not have to wait thirty days for the rule to become effective. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)
(2018). This advantage is described as “interim rulemaking.” See generally
Asimow, supra note 5. An “interim-final” rule is thus a rule adopted by an agency
that becomes immediately effective without pre-promulgation notice-andcomment. Such rules are sometimes referred to as “temporary” rules or “final
rules; comments requested.” But the term “interim-final” is used most often, and
so it will be used here. Id. at 705 n.7. A clumsier sounding (but still quite apt)
term is “final-final” rule, which refers to the rule that supplants an interim-final
rule in light of post-promulgation comments. Id. at 705. Normally, when an
agency decides to issue an interim-final rule, the adopting agency will declare
that it will consider post-effective public comments, will modify the rule in light
of those comments, and will then adopt a final-final rule. Id. at 704. However, the
agency is not legally required to do so. Unless a statute provides otherwise, an
agency’s duty under § 553 is completely discharged after adopting a rule under
the good cause exception (or any other APA exception). See id. at 711. Solicitation
of post-promulgation comments, consideration of such comments, preparation of
a statement of basis and purpose, and modification of the interim-final rule in
light of the comments are all actions that an agency assumes voluntarily. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1490–92.
44. 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974).
45. Id. at 1326.
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under the good cause exception.46 The Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals upheld the use of the exception,
reasoning that advance notice of the price freeze would have
caused a massive effort to raise prices before the freeze
deadline.47 This, the court said, would lead to greater price
inflation, which was precisely the problem that the price
controls intended to address.48
More recently, a district court judge in Washington,
D.C., vacated an IFR promulgated jointly by the
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security (the
“Departments”). The IFR required migrants to seek
protections from each country they traveled through on their
way to the southern border before they could petition for
asylum.49 The Departments argued that good cause was
warranted because making the rule available for comment
before it became final could lead to a surge of asylum seekers
at the border, since they would ostensibly rush to file a
petition before the rule went into effect and restricted their
rights.50 They also argued that their “experience has been
that when public announcements are made regarding
changes in our immigration laws and procedures, there are
dramatic increases in the numbers of aliens who enter or
attempt to enter the United States along the southern
border.”51 This, the Departments claimed, “would be
destabilizing and would jeopardize the lives and welfare of
aliens who could surge to the border to enter the United

46. Id. at 1331.
47. Id. at 1332–33.
48. Id.
49. See Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829,
33,829–30 (July 16, 2019); see also Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal. v.
Trump, No. 19-2530, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114421, at *6 (D.D.C. June 30, 2020).
50. Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114421, at
*14.
51. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,841;
see also Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114421,
at *40.
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States before the rule took effect.”52 The District Court was
not persuaded, holding that the record did “not contain
sufficient evidence” that this surge would occur while
criticizing the Departments for relying heavily on a two-yearold article from the Washington Post in making their
argument.53
B. Where Congress Intends to Waive Notice-and-Comment
An agency’s decision to invoke good cause and bypass
notice-and-comment might also be justified by congressional
intent.54 In such a case, Congress has either explicitly or
implicitly required the agency to promulgate the rule in
question immediately.55 Courts have generally accepted an
agency’s use of good cause where meeting a statutory
deadline makes it impracticable to engage in prepromulgation notice-and-comment.56 For example, in Asiana
52. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,841;
see also Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114421,
at *40.
53. Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114421, at
*41. The court continued:
Even assuming that the rule was likely to have had a similar effect as
the regulatory change described in the article, the article contains no
evidence that that change caused a surge of asylum seekers at the
border—let alone one on a scale and at a speed that would have
jeopardized their lives or otherwise have defeated the purpose of the rule
if notice-and-comment rulemaking had proceeded . . . . In fact, the article
lacks any data suggesting that the number of asylum seekers increased
at all during this time—only that more asylum seekers brought children
with them.
Id. at *42; see also Jacqueline Thomsen, ‘Failure Is Striking’: Trump-Tapped
Judge Throws Out Administration’s Asylum Restriction, LAW.COM (July 01,
2020, 8:37 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/07/01/failure-isstriking-trump-tapped-judge-throws-out-administrations-asylum-restriction/.
54. Lavilla, supra note 34, at 353–54.
55. See Kim, supra note 15.
56. See Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1236–38
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that good cause allowed Secretary of Health and Human
Services to promulgate regulations modifying method for reimbursing Medicare
providers where Congress had set a five-month time table from date of enactment
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Airlines v. Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”),57 the
FAA, pursuant to the Federal Aviation Administration
Reauthorization Act, issued an IFR without notice-andcomment, allowing it to collect $100 million in overflight
fees.58 The FAA cited an express statutory deadline as cause
for bypassing notice-and-comment, although the agency did
allow post-promulgation opportunity to comment before
issuing a final-final rule.59 In upholding the agency’s IFR, the
court noted that an express statutory deadline, without
more, is insufficient to justify the use of the good cause
exception.60 But where a deadline is coupled with
congressional intent to waive notice-and-comment, as was
the case here, good cause is justified.61
In some cases, however, Congress might express an
intent to waive notice-and-comment without establishing a
statutory deadline.62 In such circumstances, courts must
decide whether Congress’s general policy in favor of public
participation is outweighed by its intent to expedite an
agency’s promulgation of a rule.63 For instance, in Sepulveda
v. Block,64 the Secretary of Agriculture issued an IFR
revising the food stamp statute.65 In upholding the
secretary’s decision, the Second Circuit cited a Senate report
that reflected Congress’s discontent with the slow

of statute to date new procedures were to go into effect and changes were
exceedingly complex); see also Lavilla, supra note 34, at 354. But see U.S. Steel
Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the “mere existence”
of a deadline, without more, is usually insufficient to establish good cause).
57. 134 F.3d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
58. Id. at 395.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 398–99.
61. See id. at 398.
62. See Lavilla, supra note 34, at 356; Kim, supra note 15, at 1058.
63. Kim, supra note 15, at 1058.
64. 782 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 364.
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implementation of the provisions enacted the year prior.66
Contrast that case with Levesque v. Block,67 where the
First Circuit rejected an IFR promulgated without noticeand-comment despite evidence of Congress’s intent that the
rule be issued expeditiously.68 That case involved the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, which
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to give effect to the
act according to his sole discretion, qualified only by the need
for “orderly implementation.”69 The court essentially held
that “orderly” did not mean “immediate,” in this case, and so
it was inappropriate for the secretary to dispense with
notice-and-comment.70
More recently is New York v. United States Department
of Labor.71 On April 1, 2020, the Department of Labor
(“DOL”) issued a Final Rule implementing the provisions of
the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”), a
statute passed by Congress in response to the COVID-19
pandemic’s life-altering impacts on American workers.72 The
Final Rule was promulgated without notice-and-comment
pursuant to the DOL’s statutory authority to “issue
regulations for good cause under sections 553(b)(B) and
553(d)(A) . . . as necessary, to carry out the purposes of this
Act.”73 As reasons for its decision to invoke this authority,
the agency explained:
The COVID-19 pandemic has escalated at a rapid pace and scale,
leaving American families with difficult choices in balancing work,
child care, and the need to seek medical attention for illness caused
by the virus. To avoid economic harm to American families facing

66. Id. at 366.
67. 723 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1983).
68. Id. at 184.
69. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. at 184–85.
71. No. 20-CV-3020, 2020 WL 4462260 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2020).
72. Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020).
73. Id. at 190.
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these conditions, a decision to undertake notice-and-comment
rulemaking would likely delay final action on this matter by weeks
or months, and would, therefore, complicate and likely preclude the
Department from successfully exercising the authority created
[under FFCRA]. Moreover, such delay would be counter to one of
the FFCRA’s main purposes in establishing paid leave: enabling
employees to leave the workplace now to help prevent the spread of
COVID-19.74

The agency’s decision to forego notice-and-comment was
not challenged, however.75 This is because congressional
authorization to invoke good cause was baked into FFCRA
itself.76
C. Emergencies
Far and away the most relevant scenario in a world
shaped by a pandemic is a good cause claim on the basis of
an emergency.77 Courts have generally upheld an agency’s
decision to invoke good cause and bypass notice-andcomment where there was some compelling exigency.78

74. Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed.
Reg. 19,326, 19,342 (Apr. 6, 2020).
75. See generally New York, 2020 WL 4462260.
76. Even though the court ultimately severed the offending provisions from
the DOL’s Final Rule for substantive reasons, id. at *13, a procedural challenge
to the agency’s decision to invoke good cause would likely not have been
successful, even if Congress had not explicitly authorized it. To be sure, the DOL’s
rule offered little in substance to protect American families from economic harm
resulting from COVID-19. We might even say that the rule invited harm by
excluding certain employees from receiving paid leave. But the question is more
procedural. The question is whether a delay in promulgating the rule would have
resulted in imminent harm, not whether the rule itself results in harm. In this
case it would have. A delay in promulgating something would have visited serious
consequences on the American workers who needed to know how FFCRA would
be administered in order to plan their departure from the workplace and prevent
the spread of the disease. So, in essence, the DOL was permitted to issue an
immediately effective rule given its circumstances, just not a bad one.
77. Cf. Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1123 (“[E]xceptions to [notice-andcomment] are a critical testing ground for the administrative law of
emergencies.”).
78. Kim, supra note 15, at 1053.
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However, this is a high bar.79 Courts generally require that
the situation be so compelling as to pose an immediate threat
to public health, safety, or welfare.80 To determine whether
a situation is so sufficiently grave as to merit a finding of
good cause, courts examine the “nature” of the interest that
is threatened, and decide whether that situation warrants a
departure from notice-and-comment.81 Ultimately, the
analysis tends to be highly contextual and fact intensive.82
Imminent threats to human life and physical security
normally constitute a grave enough situation to justify use of
the good cause exception.83 In Hawaii Helicopter Operators
Ass’n v. Federal Aviation Administration,84 the FAA
bypassed notice-and-comment in promulgating new airsafety rules after a series of helicopter air-tour accidents.85
The FAA cited as justification for its decision an urgent
threat to public safety, including the fact that there were
twenty air-tour accidents and twenty-four fatalities within
the last three years.86 The court held that the FAA’s finding
of good cause was valid, pointing out that no motive other
than public safety was conceivable for waiving notice-andcomment.87
However, the evidence of an immediate threat to human

79. See id. (“Courts, however, have not upheld good cause findings in every
instance where an agency faces an urgent situation, as that would encourage the
agency to use the good cause exception as an ‘escape clause’ . . . .” (citing Layne
M. Campbell, Comment, Agency Discretion to Accept Comment in Informal
Rulemaking: What Constitutes “Good Cause” Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 1980 BYU L. REV. 93, 96 (1980))).
80. Id. (citations omitted).
81. See Lavilla, supra note 34, at 363.
82. See id.
83. Kim, supra note 15, at 1054.
84. 51 F.3d 212 (9th Cir. 1995).
85. Id. at 214.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 214–15.
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life must be compelling.88 In Texas Food Industry Ass’n v.
United States Department of Agriculture,89 the Department
of Agriculture (“DOA”) imposed a new labeling requirement
for uncooked and partially cooked meat and poultry products
without notice-and-comment.90 As justification, the DOA
cited a public health emergency stemming from E. coli
contamination and continuing instances of undercooked
hamburgers.91 The court rejected the DOA’s finding of good
cause, reasoning that the E. coli outbreak was geographically
isolated and was the result of negligence of fast food chains.92
The protection of the economic health of the country as a
whole might also merit a finding of good cause.93 In Reeves v.
Simon,94 the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals held
that the Federal Energy Office (“FEO”) was able to bypass
notice-and-comment when it issued a rule prohibiting gasstation operators from reserving their available fuel for
regular customers.95 In doing so, the court explained that
good cause was justified by a national emergency resulting
from violence at gas stations due to fuel shortages.96
Finally, in Jifry v. Federal Aviation Administration,97
the FAA in conjunction with the Transportation Security
Administration (“TSA”) published new rules governing the

88. Kim, supra note 15, at 1054; see also Hedge v. Lyng, 689 F. Supp. 884, 893
(D. Minn. 1987) (holding that Secretary of Agriculture’s concern about possible
disruption of his existing calendar if regulations governing election of FmHA
county committee members were not expeditiously adopted did not rise to level
of an “emergency,” such as would constitute good cause).
89. 842 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
90. Id. at 256–57.
91. Id. at 257.
92. Id. at 260.
93. Kim, supra note 15, at 1055.
94. 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974).
95. Id. at 457–58.
96. Id. at 459. These events took place during the 1973 Oil Crisis.
97. 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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revocation of airman certificates if a pilot was found to be a
security risk in the wake of 9/11.98 The agency reasoned that
prior notice-and-comment “could delay the ability of TSA and
the FAA to take effective action to keep persons found by
TSA to pose a security threat from holding an airman
certificate,” and that dispensing with the process was
“necessary to prevent a possible imminent hazard to aircraft,
persons, and property within the United States.”99
Two pilots challenged these rules, arguing that they
lacked a “rational basis” because the FAA already had the
statutory authority to do what the rules prescribed, and
therefore notice-and-comment was not “impracticable,
unnecessary or contrary to the public interest.”100 The D.C.
Circuit found that Congress only gave the FAA permissive
authority and that the rules mandated the process by which
an individual’s pilot certificate would automatically be
revoked if the TSA notified the FAA that a pilot posed a
security risk.101 The court ultimately held that the agencies’
“legitimate concern over the threat of further terrorist acts
involving aircraft in the aftermath of September 11, 2001,”
was enough to constitute good cause.102
As these cases show, courts have generally upheld an
agency’s use of good cause where (1) delay would frustrate
the purpose of a legislative objective; (2) Congress intended
to waive notice-and-comment; or (3) there was an
emergency.103 To balance the need for public participation in
rulemaking with the desire for efficiency in that process,
courts should ensure that only these compelling situations
qualify for the exception.104
98. Id. at 1176–77.
99. Id. at 1179 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 1178.
101. Id. at 1179.
102. Id. at 1179–80.
103. See Kim, supra note 15, at 1054–58.
104. For a discussion of the various legislative attempts to reform the exception
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II. THE CASE FOR THE “MIXED” STANDARD OF REVIEW
Identifying precisely what circumstances warrant a
finding of good cause is only half of the battle, however.
There is still the procedural confusion over the appropriate
standard of review to apply to an agency’s decision that good
cause exists.105 Some courts say the action should be
and an argument that Congress should amend the language to reflect only these
narrow circumstances, see generally id. This Comment focuses on what courts
can do now to better handle the exception without having to wait for legislative
reform.
105. Because de novo review is a much more “exacting” standard than the
deferential posture of arbitrary and capricious review, COLE, supra note 8, at 13–
14, the selection of a standard should be vital to the outcome. It appears that it
hasn’t been in many cases. Take for example the circuits’ review of the attorney
general’s IFR applying SORNA retroactively. In that context, the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits reviewed the attorney general’s decision to invoke the exception de
novo. In contrast, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits reviewed for arbitrary and
capriciousness. However, the results in these cases do not seem to follow from the
chosen standards of review. For instance, the Fourth and Sixth circuits both
applied de novo review, but reached opposite outcomes. Similarly, the Fifth and
Eleventh circuits went in different directions but under the arbitrary and
capricious standard. Some might say that this incongruence suggests, as courts
and scholars have argued, that the standard of review does not matter. See, e.g.,
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163 (1999) (“[W]e have failed to uncover a single
instance in which a reviewing court conceded that the use of one standard rather
than the other would in fact have produced a different outcome.”); Ernest
Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 771, 780 (1975) (famously stating that in the context of judicial review of
administrative decisions, “the rules governing judicial review have no more
substance at the core than a seedless grape”); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies,
96 VA. L. REV. 135, 138 (2010) (“[C]ourts do not, in the end, discern the differences
among these various doctrines, frequently do not distinguish among the doctrines
in application, and probably do not really care which standard of review they
apply most of the time.”); cf. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 448 F.2d 1127,
1142 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Leventhal, J., dissenting) (prematurely believing that he
had found the “case dreamed of by law school professors” where the agency's
findings, though “clearly erroneous,” were “nevertheless” supported by
“substantial evidence”). Judge Richard Posner is slightly more optimistic,
suggesting that there are just two standards—“plenary,” and “deferential”—
which are operationally capable of having an impact on the outcome. United
States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995). But Judge Posner acknowledges
the folly of trying to draw any other palpable distinctions. See id. (“We are not
fetishistic about standards of appellate review. We acknowledge that there are
more verbal formulas for the scope of appellate review (plenary or de novo, clearly
erroneous, abuse of discretion, substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious,
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reviewed de novo,106 arguing that an agency’s decision to
bypass notice-and-comment is a failed “observance of
procedure required by law” under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).107
Others advocate for the more deferential “arbitrary and
capricious” standard under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).108 This Part
argues that neither is sufficient, since either approach treats
an agency’s good cause determination as a one-dimensional
action rather than the multifaceted decision that it is. In
other words, applying arbitrary and capricious review, on its
own, to an agency’s decision to use good cause affords
deference to agencies in areas where it is not due—namely
legal conclusions—and applying only de novo review
some evidence, reasonable basis, presumed correct, and maybe others) than there
are distinctions actually capable of being drawn in the practice of appellate
review.”). This Comment assumes, as one should hope, that the standard of
review matters.
106. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
894 F.3d 95, 113 (2d Cir. 2018); Sorenson Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702,
706 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (calling an agency’s use of good cause a “legal conclusion”
and thus the standard of review “is de novo”); United States v. Brewer, 766 F.3d
884, 888 (8th Cir. 2014) (“The Fourth and Sixth Circuits, however, applied de
novo review.”); United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 507 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting
that the Fourth and Sixth Circuits applied de novo review without explicitly
saying so); United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 434 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009) (Griffin,
J., dissenting) (“It appears that the majority has reviewed de novo the attorney
general’s finding of good cause.”); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th
Cir. 2009).
107. See Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 506 (“De novo review follows from the limited
scope of review provided to courts in § 706(2)(D) to ensure that agency actions,
findings, and conclusions are completed in ‘observance of procedure required by
law,’ which is a legal question for which de novo review would typically be
utilized.” (citing Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376–77 (1989)));
see also COLE, supra note 8, at 13. But see Meister v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 623 F.3d
363, 370–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that cases brought under
section 706(2)(D) are reviewed de novo but conceding that the court’s review “as
a practical matter is often more deferential than that” and that “the arbitraryand-capricious standard frequently governs”).
108. See United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 928 (5th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Brewer, 766 F.3d
at 888 (“This deferential standard appears similar to the approach taken by the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which each used an arbitrary-and-capricious
standard.”); Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507 (noting “the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’
use of the arbitrary and capricious standard in their SORNA decisions”).
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withholds deference in areas where the agency should
receive it—namely factual determinations.109 Accordingly,
this Part argues for a two-step analysis, where the standard
of review at step one is “arbitrary and capricious,” and the
standard at step two is de novo. At least one court and one
commentator advocate for such a review, calling it the
“mixed” standard.110
Section II.A provides an overview of such a standard as
discussed in the Third Circuit’s decision in Reynolds. Then,
Section II.B argues that the mixed standard as depicted in
Reynolds is the correct standard because it is consistent with
the spirit and the text of the APA,111 better embraces the
complex and multidimensional nature of agency
rulemaking,112 and allocates a more accurate amount of
deference to an agency’s use of the good cause exception.
Most importantly, this approach will ensure consistency in
courts’ interpretations of good cause as employed in the APA.
A. Reynolds’s Middle Ground
This Comment’s two-step analysis can be traced to the
Third Circuit’s decision in Reynolds. In that case, the Third
Circuit noted that the standard of review question “has not
received in-depth analysis despite the disagreement on the
ultimate conclusion” and that “only the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits have directly linked their discussion of the standard
to § 706.”113 The court proceeded to supply that analysis,

109. Cf. Virelli, supra note 20, at 724 (rejecting a “one-dimensional” approach
that treats arbitrary and capricious review as a unitary concept—”as applying
the same standard in the same way across all manner of agency conduct”—and
instead arguing that arbitrary and capricious review should divide
administrative decisions into their constituent parts).
110. See Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 509; Golinghorst, supra note 21, at 1300.
111. See Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 509.
112. Virelli, supra note 20, at 727.
113. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507. Section 706 of the APA, titled “Scope of
Review,” enumerates the available standards a reviewing court can use when
“set[ting] aside agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(F) (2018).
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stating that the disagreement over the standard of review “is
heightened by the absence of an expressed standard in many
non-SORNA114 good cause decisions by courts of appeals.”115
Instead, these cases were resolved by interpreting the good
cause exception with a limiting principle, “commonly
formulated as a direction that ‘good cause’ should be
‘narrowly construed.’”116 These courts have explained that
this framework dictates that “circumstances justifying
reliance on the good cause exception are indeed rare and will
be accepted only after the court has examined closely
proffered rationales justifying the elimination of public
procedures.”117 This regime, the court noted, “has been
developed separate and apart from § 706, derived from the
legislative history of the good cause exception.”118 The court
acknowledged that this principle seems to point towards de
novo review, but pulled back and stated that “the close
examination required by de novo review is inconsistent with
the deference afforded under the arbitrary and capricious

114. The Reynolds case entered the discussion in the context of the attorney
general’s retroactive application of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (“SORNA”) without notice-and-comment, which is the primary
stage for the debate over the appropriate standard of review. See generally COLE,
supra note 8; Golinghorst, supra note 21; Kim, supra note 15.
115. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507; see also COLE, supra note 8, at 14
(“Complicating matters, however, is the practice of some courts to not clearly
adopt either standard, but focus instead on simply ‘narrowly constru[ing]’ the
provision.” (citing Mid–Tex Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 822
F.2d 1123, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d
752, 764 (3d Cir. 1982))).
116. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507 (citations omitted); see also California v. Azar,
911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2019) (not applying a standard of review to the good
cause exception but declaring that “[g]ood cause is to be ‘narrowly construed and
only reluctantly countenanced’” (quoting Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 612 (9th
Cir. 1984))); see also Lavilla, supra note 34, at 333–34 n.66 (1989) (collecting cases
applying a narrow construction of the good cause exemption).
117. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 764 (3d Cir. 1982)).
118. Id. at 508 (citing Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 291–92 (3d
Cir. 1977)).
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standard.”119 Then, citing Philadelphia Citizens in Action v.
Schweiker,120 a previous Third Circuit decision, the Reynolds
court suggested that the narrow-construction principle can
be applied in a way where arbitrary and capricious review
and de novo review can coexist: by using a “mixed”
standard.121
In Schweiker, the Third Circuit reviewed de novo
whether “shortness of time can []ever constitute good cause
for invoking the [good cause] exemption.”122 Simultaneously,
the court applied arbitrary and capricious review to
determine whether the agency’s claim that alternative
procedures were impracticable was correct.123 After
discussing this, the court in Reynolds explained the “mixed”
standard:
Schweiker’s bifurcated analysis shows that the narrowconstruction limiting-principle supports the third standard
available—a mixed standard—consistent with both de novo and
arbitrary and capricious review. This mixed standard requires that
we review de novo whether the agency’s asserted reason for waiver
of notice and comment constitutes good cause, as well as whether
the established facts reveal justifiable reliance on the reason. But
any factual determinations made by the agency to support its
proffered reason are subject to arbitrary and capricious review.124

119. Id. (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council, 683 F.2d at 760, 764).
120. 669 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1982).
121. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 508.
122. 669 F.2d at 883.
123. Id. at 886.
124. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 508. The APA does not explicitly mention the
standard for reviewing factual determinations in informal proceedings such as
notice-and-comment rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(F) (2018). However,
the APA provides that factual findings made in formal proceedings are reviewed
for “substantial evidence.” § 706(2)(E) (requiring a court to set aside agency action
that is “unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557”). Although a similar provision does not exist for informal proceedings, courts
consider the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard found in section 706(2)(A)
to be a “catchall” provision for judicial review of agency actions, including factual
determinations made in informal rulemaking. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C.
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This analysis, the Reynolds court noted, “is consistent
with the text of § 706 because it includes no requirement that
only one provision of the section be applied to a particular
review” and “allows [courts] to apply one standard to legal
determinations and another to factual determinations made
in an administrative decision.”125 The court’s analysis more
or less ended here, as it ultimately declined to adopt any of
these standards and resolve the tension, holding that the
agency’s assertion of good cause failed “even the most
deferential standard.”126
Cir. 1984) (holding that the scope of review provisions of the APA are
“cumulative” and that section 706(2)(A)’s arbitrary and capricious provision is a
“catchall” that “enabl[es] courts to strike down, as arbitrary, agency action that
is devoid of needed factual support”). The Supreme Court has explained that this
review requires courts to determine whether the agency’s factual findings are
supported by “substantial evidence” in light of the “whole record.” Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951). Under this test, courts
determine whether the facts are supported by “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting
Consol. Edison Co. v. Labor Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). So although judicial
review of discretionary decisions and factual determinations share the same
textual footing in the APA, they are reviewed under separate and distinct
substantive tests. See infra note 135 (discussing hard-look review for
discretionary decisions).
125. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 509.
126. Id. This technique is not uncommon. Because of the confusion
surrounding the appropriate standard of review, some courts avoid the question
altogether by finding that the agency’s use of the exception fell even under the
most deferential option. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. President United States, 930
F.3d 543, 567 n.22 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Though the review standard for agency
assertions of good cause remains an open question in our circuit, we need not
answer that question here. Even applying the most deferential of the potential
standards—reviewing the agency’s good cause determination to see if it is
arbitrary and capricious—the IFRs cannot stand.” (citation omitted)); United
States v. Brewer, 766 F.3d 884, 888 (8th Cir. 2014) (“While we recognize that [the
circuit split] is unhelpful, we agree with the Third Circuit that the attorney
general’s assertion of good cause fails under any of the above standards.”); Mack
Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“But we need not decide the
standard of review since, even if we were to review EPA’s assertion of ‘good cause’
simply to determine if it is arbitrary or capricious, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), we would
still find it lacking.”). The reverse is also true. See United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d
408, 434 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (arguing for arbitrary and
capricious review but realizing that “under either standard of review, good cause
has been shown”). This strategy is used outside of the good cause context as well.
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (declining to adopt a level
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B. Justifications For the “Mixed” Approach
This Section aims to pick up where Reynolds left off and
offer some additional justifications for the bifurcated
standard. Mainly, a two-step approach is correct because it
better embraces the multidimensional nature of the good
cause exception,127 thus allocating a more accurate amount
of deference to an agency’s use of the exception. When courts
review an agency’s use of the exception they generally
examine (1) the agency’s factual findings supporting its
decision to invoke good cause; and (2) the ultimate conclusion
that these findings are so compelling as to rise to the level of
good cause.128 These two components of the good cause
exception are separate and distinct. As such, they should be
treated differently and should receive a different amount of
deference.129 And applying either de novo or arbitrary and
of scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation because the state
law at issue fell under the most deferential level of scrutiny); Nat. Res. Def.
Council v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 421 F.3d 872, 878–89 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We
need not resolve this question here, because even under the Chevron standard of
review, the 2002 quota was based on an impermissible construction of the Act.”);
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Wilson N. Jones Mem’l. Hosp., 374 F.3d 362, 369
(5th Cir. 2004) (“We do not need to decide whether the [agency]’s interpretation
of annuity starting date warrants Chevron deference because it is clear that the
[agency]’s order may be upheld as a matter of law under the less deferential
standard set forth in [Mead].”).
127. Cf. Virelli, supra note 20, at 727.
128. Cf. Boliek, supra note 27, at 3363.
129. Breaking down an agency action into its constituent parts and applying
different standards to each part is not a new idea. In his article Deconstructing
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, Professor Louis J. Virelli III developed a
multifaceted “deconstruction” model which aims to apply varying degrees of
arbitrary and capricious review to each individual component of an agency’s
action. The model reveals a subset of discrete inquiries within arbitrary and
capricious review that courts can use to properly check agency action while
promoting administrative efficiency and legitimacy. Virelli, supra note 20, at 737.
In doing so, it distinguishes between “first-order” agency conduct, which includes
“modes of self-education and information gathering,” and “second-order” agency
conduct, which includes an agency’s “choice of relevant factors to influence its
final policy conclusions and the relationship between that conclusion and the
agency’s supporting rationale.” Id. at 738. Each of these types of agency behavior,
according to the model, are subject to varying degrees of deference based upon
their proximity to the ultimate policy choice made by the agency. Id. at 738–39.
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capricious review by themselves ignores these important
differences. For instance, underlying any given good cause
claim are the agency’s factual determinations,130 which
generally implicate the agency’s expertise and thus should
receive deference.131 So applying de novo review in a
blanketed fashion would ignore the case for deference to an
agency’s factual findings.132 Therefore, it is appropriate that
the first step in this bifurcated analysis is to apply arbitrary
and capricious review to the agency’s underlying factual
determinations.
Analyzing the second step, the agency’s ultimate
conclusion that the underlying findings are so compelling as
to rise to the level of good cause, is less straight forward. This
is because courts appear to disagree about whether to
classify good cause as a “legal conclusion” or a “discretionary
decision.”133 This distinction matters because the amount of
deference owed to the agency’s ultimate decision to invoke
good cause depends on this classification.134 If the decision is
classified as discretionary, then it would seem that arbitrary
and capricious review should apply through and through,
that is, to both steps one and two.135 In contrast, those in the
130. See Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 612 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Our inquiry into
whether the Secretary properly invoked ‘good cause’ proceeds case-by-case,
sensitive to the totality of the factors at play.”); Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1123
(“[Good cause] cases are exceedingly factbound.”).
131. See Scheduled Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc. v. Dep’t of Def., 87 F.3d 1356,
1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
132. Golinghorst, supra note 21, at 1297.
133. See COLE, supra note 8, at 13.
134. Id. at 10
135. Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit ultimately coined the term “hardlook” review to describe the type of review afforded to an agency’s discretionary
decisions. See Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (stating that an agency decision should be overturned “if the court becomes
aware, especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not
really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged
in reasoned decision-making” (footnote omitted)); Harold Levanthal,
Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509,
514 (1974) (“The court does not make the ultimate decision, but it insists that the
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official or agency take a ‘hard look’ at all relevant factors.”). Hard-look review has
since become synonymous with arbitrary and capricious review. Virelli, supra
note 20, at 727–28. Under this approach, the reviewing court’s role is “to make
sure that agency ‘expertise’ does not disguise agency refusal to deal with
agonizing questions or with cogent opposition to its intended direction.” Patricia
M. Wald, Judicial Review of Complex Administrative Agency Decisions, 462
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 77 (1982). So long as the agency has not
“shirked this fundamental task,” then the court “exercises restraint and affirms
the agency’s action even though this court would on its own account have made
different findings . . . .” Greater Bos. Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 851. The
Supreme Court endorsed this movement towards a new approach to arbitrary
and capricious review, see Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 415–17 (1971), then cemented its applicability by famously stating a number
of factors that courts must consider when reviewing an agency’s action for
arbitrariness:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983). Although normally described as a “doctrine of deference,” Virelli, supra
note 20, at 761, arbitrary and capricious review under the hard-look approach
provides meaningful constraint against otherwise unchecked agency discretion,
a much-needed consolation for the lack of constitutional text supporting the
administrative state. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World
of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 768 (2008) (“[A]rbitrariness
review can be seen as a response to the uneasy constitutional position of agencies
wielding broad discretionary power; perhaps such review can reintroduce
surrogate safeguards for the decline of constitutional checks on agency
authority.”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons
for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 440 (1987) (“[Hard-look] review
acknowledges the unique constitutional position of agencies outside the tripartite
system of government envisioned by the Framers, and compensates through
heightened scrutiny of agency decisions in the form of the requirement that
agencies give adequate reasons.”). At the same time, hard-look review limits
courts in their ability to impermissibly intrude upon institutional values such as
agency expertise and independence. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 53 (“[Passing
upon the generalizability of field studies] is precisely the type of issue which rests
within the expertise of [the agency], and upon which a reviewing court must be
most hesitant to intrude.”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)
(fearing that reviewing courts, in supplying their own reasons, would tread “into
the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative
agency”); Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the
Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1772 (2012) (“Naturally, expertise also
figures into judicial review as a reason for deference to agencies.”).
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de novo camp would say that such action is a “legal
conclusion,”136 an interpretation of the APA’s text which
agencies do not have authority to do.137
An agency’s ultimate decision to invoke good cause after
relying on its factual findings is a legal conclusion, not a
discretionary decision.138 The APA is unlike an agency’s
organic statute where the agency’s expertise can be brought
to bear on a particular statutory provision.139 Rather, a good
cause claim is an exercise of “statutory interpretation upon
which the court is ready and able to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency” about whether its circumstances rise
to the level of good cause.140 So although agencies are experts

136. See, e.g., Sorenson Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (“Therefore, our review of the agency’s legal conclusion of good cause is de
novo.”); Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 872 (8th Cir. 2013) (agreeing
with the Ninth Circuit that the rationale for deferring to an agency action is not
present where the question is whether the agency has followed the law).
137. See, e.g., Sorenson, 755 F.3d at 706 (“[A]n agency has no interpretive
authority over the APA.”); Reno-Sparks Indian Colony v. EPA, 336 F.3d 899, 910
n.11 (9th Cir. 2003) (“This Court reviews de novo the agency’s decision not to
follow the APA’s notice and comment procedures. The agency is not entitled to
deference because complying with the notice and comment provisions when
required by the APA ‘is not a matter of agency choice.’” (quoting Sequoia Orange
Co. v. Yeutter, 973 F.2d 752, 757 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992))); Campanale & Sons v.
Evans, 311 F.3d 109, 120 n.14 (1st Cir. 2002) (“We are unaware of any line of
cases that allows an agency to make a binding determination that it has complied
with specific requirements of the law.”); Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 194 F.3d 72, 79 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen it comes to
statutes administered by several different agencies—statutes, that is, like the
APA and unlike the standing provision of the Atomic Energy Act—courts do not
defer to any one agency’s particular interpretation.”); Warden v. Shalala, 149
F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 1998) (reviewing de novo whether an agency’s rule was
substantive or interpretive under the APA’s exception for interpretive rules);
Zaring, supra note 105, at 146 (“De novo review is appropriate when agencies are
interpreting laws that they do not have a special responsibility to administer, like
the Constitution, the APA, or Title VII.”).
138. The subtle question of whether to classify good cause as a discretionary
decision or a legal conclusion, and the reasons for doing so, for purposes of the
standard of review has yet to receive any in-depth treatment. See generally COLE,
supra note 8; Golinghorst, supra note 21.
139. JAMES T. O’REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 3:14 (2020 ed. 2020).
140. Id.; Wells v. Schweiker, 536 F. Supp 1314, 1324 (E.D. La. 1982) (“[T]he
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in their particular fields,141 “‘good cause’ is a term of art in a
statute,” and “the courts are equally or more capable than an
agency is to interpret the APA term ‘good cause’ without
deference to an agency’s view of the APA.”142 Professor James
T. O’Reilly’s argument on this topic merits quotation in full:
On matters of public procedural rights before administrative
agencies, the courts do not readily defer to agency preferences
where private persons are affected. Although the federal courts
might defer to agency choices on an objective definitional question,
the existence of good cause is a question of statutory interpretation

Secretary argues that his determination that good cause existed to dispense with
s 553 procedures is to be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. I conclude that I
am bound by the Fifth Circuit’s approach . . . . [which] subjected the agency’s
determination of good cause to independent review . . . . This standard of review
is especially appropriate here, since Mrs. Wells alleges the legal insufficiency of
the Secretary’s assertion of good cause, an issue of statutory interpretation
traditionally committed to courts.”); see also, e.g., Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682
F.3d 87, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (giving “no particular deference” to the agency in
holding that notice-and-comment was not “impracticable” for agency’s rule
because it did not stave off any imminent threat to the environment or safety or
national security); id. at 94 (holding that the “unnecessary” prong of the exception
is confined to those situations in which the administrative rule is a routine
determination, insignificant in nature and impact, and inconsequential to the
industry and to the public); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 803
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that it is “axiomatic” that a conclusory
recitation of good cause does not constitute good cause while holding that a desire
to provide immediate guidance, without more, is insufficient to bypass noticeand-comment); Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n v. Duke, 291 F. Supp. 3d 5, 15, 17
(D.D.C. 2017) (reviewing de novo and holding that alleged expense of
implementing rule allowing certain foreign entrepreneurs to obtain immigration
parole did not justify Department of Homeland Security’s failure to comply with
APA’s notice-and-comment requirements); Hedge v. Lyng, 689 F. Supp. 884, 893
(D. Minn. 1987) (holding that Secretary of Agriculture’s concern about possible
disruption of his existing calendar if regulations governing election of FmHA
county committee members were not expeditiously adopted did not rise to level
of an “emergency,” such as would constitute good cause).
141. Cameron B. Alston, Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States
Forest Service, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 727, 740–41 (2000).
142. O’REILLY, supra note 139; see also Scheduled Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc.
v. Dep’t of Def., 87 F.3d 1356, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[W]e face a pure question of
statutory interpretation independent of the complex factual determinations or
policy judgments particularly within agencies’ expertise. The question under the
APA is not whether the Department acted arbitrarily or capriciously, as in
ordinary challenges to procurement decisions, but rather whether it acted in
accordance with [federal] law.”).
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first and foremost. Congress did not delegate the express power to
enforce the APA to any particular agency; good cause definitions
involve no agency-specific expertise; so under the statute, the
agency should not expect to be able to interpret good cause without
justifying it under very careful judicial scrutiny.
Both the courts’ attentiveness to public participation values, and
the attentiveness of the courts to legislative history, should warn
agencies not to adopt rules without spelling out their good cause
claim in express terms.143

The view that invoking good cause is a legal conclusion
would also be well supported by a majority of courts, given
that de novo review is the majority approach.144 Lastly,
classifying the decision as such is more consistent with the
APA’s legislative history, since characterizing the action as
a discretionary decision could potentially transform the
exception into an “escape clause,” controverting legislative
intent.145 Therefore, it makes good sense that the second step
in this analysis would be for the court, after reviewing the
agency’s factual findings for arbitrary and capriciousness, to
apply de novo review to the agency’s ultimate decision to rely
on those findings in deciding that good cause exists. To help
guide this part of the analysis, courts should determine
whether the circumstances before them fit into one of the
circumscribed categories described in Part I supra.146

143. O’REILLY, supra note 139.
144. Kim, supra note 15, at 1077.
145. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 200.
146. See supra Part I.
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III. THE “MIXED” APPROACH IS NOT AN OUTLIER
Since Reynolds, the mixed standard has received very
little scholarly support, with only one commentator
advocating on its behalf.147 A possible reason for this is
because the Schweiker decision “appears to be an outlier
from the body of good-cause case-law from [the Third
Circuit], as well as other courts of appeals.”148 This Part
argues that the mixed standard that was used in Schweiker,
as conceptualized thus far in this Comment, is not an
outlier.149 Specifically, as a practical matter, the D.C. Circuit,
the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals,150 and at least
one Fifth Circuit district court have applied some form of
mixed review, whether or not they explicitly declared they
were applying such review.
For instance, in Sorenson Commissions, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, the D.C. Circuit examined
whether the FCC had good cause when it issued several IFRs
raising
standards
for
telecommunications
service
151
providers. In doing so, the court declared that its “review
of the agency’s legal conclusion of good cause is de novo.”152
To give deference, the court noted, “would be to run afoul of
congressional intent.”153 However, in a footnote the court

147. See generally Golinghorst, supra note 21; see also Miriam R. Stiefel,
Comment, Invalid Harms: Improper Use of the Administrative Procedure Act’s
Good Cause Exemption, 94 WASH. L. REV. 927 (2019) (acknowledging Reynolds’s
mixed standard).
148. United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 508–09 (3d Cir. 2013).
149. Cf. COLE, supra note 8, at 14 n.129 (“It is unclear whether other courts
that apply de novo review to agency good cause determinations would recognize
[the mixed standard] as distinct.”).
150. The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals was abolished by The Act of
October 29, 1992, Pub. L. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506, and both its jurisdiction and
its pending cases were transferred to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.
151. 755 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
152. Id. at 706.
153. Id.
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stated that it will “defer to [the] agency’s factual findings and
expert judgments therefrom, unless such findings and
judgments are arbitrary and capricious.”154 This bifurcated
analysis is precisely the type of review the Reynolds court
attributed to the Schweiker decision.155
Another case is Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of
Energy.156 There, the FEA bypassed notice-and-comment in
issuing a regulatory change in oil price controls.157 The new
rule clarified an ambiguity in existing regulations that oil
sellers were taking advantage of to avoid FEA regulations.158
In upholding the FEA’s decision to invoke good cause, the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals reviewed whether
there were “compelling circumstances surrounding the
discriminatory pricing practices cited by the agency.”159 In
this instance, the court was reviewing whether the agency’s
anticipated consequences for engaging in notice-andcomment rose to the level of good cause. Accordingly, the
court reviewed that determination under a de novo
standard,160 ultimately finding that “the threat to the public
would be sufficiently dire for good cause to be found.”161
The court continued to address “whether, as a matter of
fact, [the agency’s] finding of good cause is supported by the
administrative record.”162 Here the court was reviewing
whether the circumstances the agency claimed to warrant
good cause had adequate factual support. The court

154. Id. at n.3.
155. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
156. 728 F.2d 1477 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983).
157. Id. at 1482.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 1491.
160. See id. at 1486–87 (“We are free to make an independent determination
of the legal question as to whether the agency has made a showing of good
cause.”).
161. Id. at 1492.
162. Id.
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acknowledged that “[a]n agency’s procedural compliance
with statutory norms . . . is subject to close[] scrutiny,” but so
far as “the requisite procedures involve factual
determinations, deference is still afforded to agency
judgments. The ultimate question remains whether or not
the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious, that is,
unreasonable.”163 The court proceeded to analyze the
evidence and concluded “that the record supports [the
agency’s] good cause finding.”164
Finally, a less explicit example is Texas Food Industry
Ass’n v. United States Department of Agriculture.165 In that
case, the DOA imposed a new labeling requirement for
uncooked and partially cooked meat and poultry products
without notice-and-comment.166 As justification, the DOA
cited a public health emergency stemming from E. coli
contamination and continuing instances of undercooked
hamburgers.167 The court rejected the DOA’s finding of good
cause, reasoning that the E. coli outbreak was geographically
isolated and was the result of negligence of fast food
chains.168 In addition, the court found that the costs of
compliance with the rule drastically outweighed the benefits
of issuing the rule immediately.169 In essence, the court just
did not think the agency’s circumstances were captured by
the language of the rule, and in order to be faithful to
Congress’s intent, the court stated:
The public is served by federal agencies following the guidelines
that Congress has established. Some federal agencies are given
extraordinary powers but those powers may not be casually
exercised. Indeed, those powers are extraordinary primarily

163. Id. at 1486 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 1493.
165. 842 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
166. Id. at 256–57.
167. Id. at 257.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 261.
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because the agencies are only permitted to invoke such powers in
truly rare and extraordinary circumstances. Such an extraordinary
circumstance has not been presented in this action.170

The court did not state the standard of review here, but
it did make an independent evaluation as to whether good
cause existed and rejected the use of a “conclusory statement
that normal procedures were not followed because of . . . ‘good
cause.’”171 This is consistent with de novo review. But at the
same time, the court “in no way attempt[ed] to substitute its
own judgment for the collective wisdom of the USDA . . .
regarding effective methods and approaches to combat the
problems of food-borne illnesses.”172 This language has more
of a deferential posture.
As these cases show, the Schweiker decision is no outlier.
Other courts have resolved good cause cases in a way that is
consistent with both de novo and arbitrary and capricious
review. Such an approach is “consistent with the text of
§ 706” since that section “includes no requirement that only
one provision of the section be applied to a particular review,”
which enables courts “to apply one standard to legal
determinations and another to factual determinations made
in an administrative decision.”173 In addition, this approach
“embraces the complexity and multidimensional nature of
administrative policymaking”174 and thus should be
explicitly adopted by other circuits in order to avoid further
confusion and uncertainty in this area.

170. Id.
171. Id. at 259 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 803
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975)).
172. Id. at 261.
173. United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 509 (3d Cir. 2013).
174. Virelli, supra note 20, at 727.
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CONCLUSION
The good cause exception has been applied inconsistently
across the federal circuits. Part of this divergence is
substantive. Courts struggle in identifying precisely what
circumstances warrant good cause. This is mostly due to the
vagueness of the statutory language. Because it is unlikely
that Congress will amend the language any time soon,175
courts should make their own efforts to limit dispensing with
public participation in agency rulemaking to just three
situations: (1) where prior notice would subvert the
underlying statutory scheme; (2) where Congress intends to
waive notice-and-comment; and (3) emergencies. In addition,
federal courts differ on the appropriate standard of review.
Some review the action de novo, others under the arbitrary
and capricious standard. Neither is sufficient on its own
since a one-dimensional approach to the good cause
exception does not allocate the appropriate amount of
deference to the agency’s decision to use good cause. Instead,
courts should use a two-step approach that applies arbitrary
and capricious review to the agency’s factual determinations
and de novo review to the agency’s legal conclusion of good
cause. Such an approach is consistent with the spirit and the
text of the APA, furthers the purpose of the narrowlyprescribed good cause exception, and better captures the
multidimensional nature of administrative rulemaking by
allocating a more accurate amount of deference to an
agency’s decision to use good cause. Finally, such an
approach is not an outlier: other circuits have applied some
form of mixed review to the agency’s decision to use good
cause as a practical matter. To avoid further confusion and
uncertainty in this area, other circuits should explicitly
adopt the same approach.
175. See Paynter, supra note 13, at 399 (acknowledging the several failed
attempts by Congress to amend the exception’s language, making it unlikely that
the language will be amended now (especially by one of the most divided
Congresses in recent memory)); Kim, supra note 15, at 1051–52, 1070–73
(documenting these failed attempts but asking Congress to try again).

